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The problem of state and local taxation of multistate business is
a very broad one. Although it is too big a subject to be discussed, except
in segments, one at a time, it is necessary for a full understanding of
any segment to place it in its proper perspective to the whole.
The taxing jurisdictions involved are not only the state legislatures,
but also all the subordinate units of government: counties, munici-
palities, townships, school districts, metropolitan districts, irrigation
districts, drainage districts, and many others.
The types of business involved are not only the classic examples
of pure interstate commerce-interstate transportation and communi-
cation, and interstate sales of tangible goods-but also businesses which,
though not engaging directly in interstate commerce, importantly affect
interstate commerce, such as manufacturing before interstate commerce
begins and selling after interstate commerce ends; and multistate busi-
nesses which are not interstate commerce at all, as, for example, hotel
chains. All sorts of service industries are involved, as well as transporta-
tion, communication, and dealings in tangible goods.
The taxes involved are not only those measured by business net in-
come, but many others, including ad valorem property taxes on realty,
tangible personalty, and intangibles; taxes measured by gross receipts
(sales, use, and gross income taxes) ; taxes measured by units of product
or service (cigarette taxes) ; personal income taxes; fees and taxes
for special benefits (gasoline taxes, corporation registration fees);
miscellaneous taxes (licenses and taxes on capital, severance, employ-
ment, chain stores); and responsibility for collecting taxes imposed
upon others.
The segments to be examined here are only the nexus and appor-
tionment aspects of taxes imposed by state central governments and
measured by business net income or by gross receipts.1 Even this has
*This article is based on a lecture given at the Fourteenth Annual Marquette
University Institute on Taxation.
**A.B.. Harvard University (1927); M.B.A., New York University (1931);
LL.B., Fordham University (1938); S.J.D., St. John's University, Brooklyn
(1940); attorney, General Motors Corporation; member, American, Michigan,
Detroit Bar Associations.
1All taxes measured by net business income are here considered together be-
cause their economic impact is the same, although there are striking differences
in constitutional aspects between franchise taxes measured by net income, as in
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), and taxes on net
income, as in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450 (1959). Similarly, the economics of sales and use taxes are identical
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to be narrowed, as to taxes measured by business net income, to exclude
discussion of the essential preliminary questions of what constitutes net
income and what portion thereof is apportionable as contrasted with
being specifically allocable to a particular situs.
The area of discussion thus circumscribed can be approached from
at least three points of view: what the states are doing and can do
under existing constitutional interpretations; what would be an ideal
system; and what Congress can and should do to approach the ideal.
Instead of sticking to any one, or attempting to cover all three, this
article undertakes to set forth only a sampling of considerations pertin-
ent to each of the three.
There are three constitutional factors which influence what states
may do in the absence of action by Congress. The first is the basic
principle that in our federal system the authority of a state is limited
to its own geographical territory, and that hence it may not tax persons,
things, or events not within its own boundaries. 2 Since adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, this principle has been incorporated in the con-
cept of "due process" which the states may not withhold.3 Under "due
process," sometimes aided by "equal protection," likewise commanded
by the fourteenth amendment, it has been enlarged a bit to require
some degree of reasonableness in the relationship between the measure
of the tax and the thing taxed.4 The second is exactly the same point
developed under the state constitutions instead of under the federal.
Although instances are extremely rare in which courts have given tax-
payers the benefit of state due process and equal protection require-
ments, there are exceptions.5
The third constitutional factor is the familiar but confusing one of
"interstate commerce." Article I, section 8, of the Constitution confers
upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states. Once
the Supreme Court had decided that taxation is a form of regulation,
it might have concluded either that the grant of regulatory power to
Congress was exclusive and that hence the states could not tax inter-
state commerce at all, or it might have held the power concurrent so
that the states could regulate and tax in any manner not forbidden by
Congress. The Supreme Court did neither, but chose instead a middle
course extremely difficult to follow. States may not tax the privilege
as should also be those of all other taxes measured by gross receipts, but the
constitutional rules are very different: McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (1944)
(sales tax) ; General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944)
(use tax) ; Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951) (gross
receipts tax).
2 New York, L. E. & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628 (1894).
3 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
4 Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931) ; Wisconsin v.
J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
5 City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co., 48 Cal. 2d 320, 309 P. 2d 417 (1957).
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of engaging in interstate commerce,6 nor its inseparable local incidents, 7
unless such incidents are tied in with intrastate commerce ;8 nor may
they discriminate against interstate commerce," nor subject it to multiple
burdens ;1o but they may tax its net income," its property, 12 its capital,'1 3
its use of local facilities, 4 or its payrolls, 5 among other of its aspects.
Life would have been much easier for taxpayers, tax collectors, and
courts, had the Court chosen either of the all-or-nothing approaches.
Either one would have compelled Congress to do something to define
the extent to which and the manner in which states and their subordi-
nate jurisdictions may tax interstate commerce, matters affecting inter-
state commerce, and multistate business. As Justices of the Supreme
Court itself have often remarked, this problem is peculiarly susceptible
to legislative rather than judicial solution.16 Congress, however, has
never accepted the invitation, except to the very limited extent embodied
in the McCarron Act,'1 which permits states to regulate and to tax,
discriminatorily, the insurance business, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Southeastern Underzwriters Ass'n'5
that such business constituted interstate commerce subject to federal
antitrust laws; the Jenkins Act,' which requires interstate shippers of
cigarettes to report such transactions to states which could not them-
selves impose such a requirement consistent with due process; and Pub-
lic Law 86-272,2 0 which prohibits states from imposing taxes measured
by the income of businesses which confine their in-state activities to
solicitation of orders. While these show that Congress can do something
when sufficiently aroused, they are hardly significant steps toward solu-
tion of the main problem.
This is the background of the concepts of "nexus" and "apportion-
ment." In the word "nexus," the Supreme Court, particularly in the
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota decision, 2' has
summed up the principle, now characterized as "due process," that a
state may not tax something beyond its territorial jurisdiction. There
are two kinds of "nexus": jurisdiction over the person of the taxpayer
6 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, supra note 1.
7Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
s Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra note 1.
9 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
10 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
11 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 1.
2Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 166 U.S. 185 (1897).
13Ford Motor v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939).
14 Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
15 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'6E.g., Minnesota v. Northwest Airlines, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
1759 Stat. 33, 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§1011-15 (1958).
1s322 U.S. 533 (1944).
19 As amended, 69 Stat. 627 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§375-78 (1958).
20 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. §§381-84 (Supp. V, 1963).
21358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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and jurisdiction over the transaction taxed. It is clear that the state
must have one or the other, but it is not clear which. This is an interest-
ing constitutional inquiry beyond the scope of this paper, though further
reference is made to it -later. Suffice it to say that before there can be
a tax, there must be jurisdiction in the territorial sense. Only when that
is established can the apportionment problem arise.22
Assuming, then, that the "nexus" exists, apportionment still must
obey some rules to be constitutionally acceptable. True, the Supreme
Court is extremely slow to find fault with an apportionment formula,
however outrageous it may seem to the taxpayer or to economists and
experts in public finance. Nevertheless, some apportionments can be
improper. The so-called "apportionment" must not be unduly arbi-
trary,23 nor such as to impose multiple burdens (directly and obviously)
upon interstate commerce.2 4 If it is very much distorted, it may vio-
late due process by taxing extraterritorial values; and yet of all the
many cases in which apportionment problems have figured, in only one
case has the taxpayer been successful.25 In that case, the taxpayer
demonstrated by a species of separate accounting that income arising
from activities within the taxing state was considerably less than the
formula attributed. The same demonstration has been unsuccessful in
other cases.
2 8
The foregoing cryptic summary of constitutional rules as disclosed
by the Supreme Court does not take into consideration the decisions
in Field Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington27 and General Motors
Corp. v. Washington' s Field Enterprises, decided in 1956, seems to
permit taxing the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, but
since it was simply an enigmatic per curiam affirmance, without opinion,
of the state court's decision, it raised only a minor doubt. That doubt
became still smaller when the 1959 dictum in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota2 ringingly reaffirmed the contrary
rule laid down in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor."0 Then, in
June 1964, came General Motors, a five-to-four decision upholding
application of a franchise tax, measured by unapportioned gross re-
ceipts, to sales without the state of goods manufactured without the
state to customers located in the state, when the taxpayer had traveling
representatives calling on the customers, and in addition had in the
state other wholly unrelated and admittedly taxable activities. The full-
22 Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
23 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Joseph, 307 N.Y. 342, 121 N.E. 2d 360 (1954).
24Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).25Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, supra note 4.
26 Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
27 352 U.S. 806 (1956).
2884 Sup. Ct 1564 (1964).
29 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
30 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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dress opinion is not clear as to the basis for the decision. Petition for
rehearing has been filed.
Although these problems have existed from the inception of our
federal system, they were insignificant until the development of effi-
cient long-distance transportation, the concomitant growth of inter-
state commercial intercourse, and the burgeoning of income and gross
receipts taxes. They have received the serious attention of taxpayers,
tax administrators, writers, and courts for most of the present century.
One manifestation of this attention is the Uniform Division of In-
come for Tax Purposes Act, which in 1957 was developed by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and ap-
proved by the American Bar Association. It has been adopted by Alaska,
Arkansas, Kansas, and, most recently, Indiana, the last for use in con-
nection with its just-enacted "adjusted gross income" (or you-name-
it) tax. The Uniform Act provides rules for allocation of some income
and apportionment of the balance, but does not define "nexus," which
is a fatal defect in a statute which includes, as it does, a "destination
sales" factor. Since the states have shown no eagerness to get together
and agree upon a reasonable apportionment formula, much interest has
been displayed in having one federally imposed. Supreme Court Justices
have frequently so recommended (as noted above). The American Bar
Association's Committee on State and Local Taxes has been thinking
about it since at least as early as 1957.
The big impetus came, however, in 1959 with the Supreme Court
decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,3
and, in 1960, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson.3 2 Promptly after Northwestern
States, Congress enacted Public Law 86-272, which partly defined
"nexus" and forbade taxes measured by net income from sales of
tangible goods when the only activities in the state were solicitation of
orders for the taxpayer or the taxpayer's customers; and directed Con-
gress to study the situation. Following Scripto, Public Law 86-272 was
broadened to require Congress to study the entire situation of state and
local taxation, of all kinds, of multistate business. The task has been
assigned to the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
sentatives. Its interim report, 33 hereinafter discussed, was filed June
15, 1964, and its final report is due June 30, 1965.
We noted above that "nexus" is a due process problem, and yet it
cannot be said with assurance that in enacting Public Law 86-272,
which is in terms strictly a "nexus" statute, Congress was implementing
31358 U.S. 450 (1959).
32362 U.S. 207 (1960).
33 Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, House Comm.
on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H. R. REP. No. 1480,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964).
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the power given to it by the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment
to carry out the due process provision of that amendment. Rather, it
may have been exerting its power under article I, section 8, of the
Constitution to "regulate" interstate commerce. Perhaps some clarifica-
tion of this point will develop in cases now proceeding through state
courts in which tax administrators are challenging the constitutionality
of the statute.3 4 It is not certain that although inspired by Northwestern
States, Public Law 86-272 actually overrules that decision, which in-
volved offices in the taxing state. It does, however, clearly overrule two
Louisiana cases in which attempts to obtain Supreme Court review
were unsuccessful.
35
Whether "nexus" has any importance when considering net-income-
based taxes depends upon the apportionment formula. Earlier it was
noted that there is no occasion for apportionment until nexus has been
established. However, if apportionment is worked out in certain ways
the nexus problem never arises. This seeming contradiction is not such
at all-it all depends on the formula.
What is the ideal apportionment formula? It varies with the type
of business, one of the greatest weaknesses of formulae currently in
effect being that insufficient recognition is given to differences among
businesses. Manufacturing, merchandising, financing, insuring, trans-
porting, publishing, and numerous others all have different circum-
stances requiring different treatment. One basic principle lies at the
heart of it: "[I] ncome may be defined as the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined ... ."36 Accordingly, the ideal form-
ula never includes a receipts factor. For manufacturing, it might be
tangible productive property (capital) and payroll (labor). For mer-
chandising, it might be inventory (capital) and payroll (labor). For
financing, it might be intangibles (capital) and payroll (labor). For
34 In International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 164 So. 2d 314 (La. 1964), the Supreme
Court of Louisiana upheld the constitutionality of the statute as a regulation
of interstate commerce. An attempt to obtain review by the United States
Supreme Court is a virtual certainty. A similar conclusion was reached by the
Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, in CIBA Pharmaceutical Prod. v.
State Tax Comm'n (unreported). An appeal is pending before the Supreme
Court of Missouri. In a very scholarly opinion, the Oregon Tax Court in
Smith, Kline & French Lab. v. State Tax Comm'n, 5 State Tax Cas. 5250-116(1964), held the statute unconstitutional because in form it prohibits state
taxation rather than prescribing an apportionment. The decision has been ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon. In Ownbey v. Butler, 365 S.W. 2d 33(1963), the Supreme Court of Tennessee treated the statute as an apportion-
ment statute, and held the taxpayer's entire income taxable in Tennessee be-
cause Public Law 86-272 prevented taxation of any part of it by any other
state.
3 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 101 So. 2d 70 (La.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959) ; International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 107
So. 2d 640 (La.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1958).
36 Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913), and many subsequent
United States Supreme Court decisions.
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transportation, it might be tangible property (capital) and payroll
(labor) ; or it might be ton-miles, etc., which is a measure of the ap-
plication of both capital and labor. And so on for other industries.
Now, the reason for the statement that although there can be no
apportionment without nexus, the importance of nexus depends upon
apportionment becomes clear. It is self-evident that if each of the fore-
going "ideal" formulae is used, the nexus problem never arises. It is
beyond cavil that if there is sufficient property and payroll in a jurisdic-
tion to merit a piece of the two-factor formulae described, there is
sufficient presence in the jurisdiction to constitute the required nexus.
By "ideal" is meant the formulae which should be adopted if we
were starting all over and had no need to consider existing tax struc-
tures built around the chaos of existing formulary concepts. It does
not mean that such formulae should be actively promoted under existing
conditions. Their enactment with proper safeguards is a political im-
possibility. The receipts factor, illogical, unreasonable, and groundless
though unquestionably it be, is far too popular. Even if it could be
eliminated, the result would be to increase greatly the total tax take
unless there were a drastic revision of rates.
Widely heralded these days are formulae including a "destination
sales" factor, to which considerable respectability has been lent by its
inclusion in the formula (just one for all businesses) of the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act. The sales factor, which has
no justification economically or fiscally, is the root of nearly all ap-
portionment and nexus problems, and is at its worst in the destination
sales version. In that form, it is impossible to administer, greatly
increases the number of jurisdictions to which a taxpayer must report,
and greatly increases the number of taxpayers to be followed by each
jurisdiction. It is ruinous to both taxpayer and tax administrator, and
by both is observed more in the breach than in the compliance. Its un-
soundness is well illustrated in the Uniform Act which, in an attempt
to assure that no income shall escape taxation, makes its application
dependent upon whether or not the taxpayer is "taxable" (i.e., has a
"nexus") in the taxing jurisdiction. Such cases as Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota 7 would never go to court were it
not for the "destination sales" factor. Presumably, neither taxpayer in
that case would have objected to a tax reasonably apportioned to its
actual activities (which were minimal) in the taxing state; and yet
neither challenged the "reasonableness" of the formula actually used.
Is there an acceptable compromise? Probably it may be found in
a three-factor formula of property, payroll, and sales-with sales as-
signed to the most closely connected (i.e., lowest level) "permanent
establishment" (major office) through which the sales pass. This, like
37358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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the two-factor formula, eliminates the "nexus" problem. It holds down
the number of states to which the taxpayer must report to those in
which it has sufficiently substantial connections to be reasonably ex-
pected to know local laws, and it holds down the number of taxpayers
which each state must pursue to those whom it can readily find. While
it causes a little more dislocation from present practices than does the
destination sales approach, it causes less than elimination of the sales
factor. It comes closer to attributing income to the "market" than does
the two-factor formula; and while it errs more widely in that respect
than "destination sales," the latter is itself so far off from that target
that some further deviation seems unimportant.
Turning now to gross receipts, sales, and use taxes, it is to be ob-
served that there are no important economic differences among them,
although there are legal differences.38 All such taxes, at least if imposed
by the state of the purchaser, tend to be passed on to the purchaser.
Ordinarily they are not apportioned, although there are exceptions.39
More often, credit is given for a sales or use tax previously paid.
Since such taxes are normally borne by the purchaser, they all fit
within the economic definition of "use tax." The problem of the vendor
is not one of tax paying, but of tax collecting. Unlike the income tax
situation, in which both taxpayer and tax administrator will benefit
from any clarification of the rules, there is here a genuine conflict of
interest between the taxpayer (i.e., collecting vendor) and the tax ad-
ministrator. It is extremely difficult for the tax administrator to collect
on sales to household consumers unless the vendor does it for him,
and it is extremely burdensome for a vendor to have to find out about
and assume responsibility for taxes imposed by foreign states.
The legal problem is "nexus": what connection must the vendor
have with the foreign state to require him to act as its tax collector?
Must the state have some jurisdiction over the taxed transaction, or
only over the person of the involuntary tax collector? There has been
no resolution of these questions. Apparently the constitutional rule,
only rudimentary in its development, looks in the direction of jurisdic-
tion over the person, 0 although jurisdiction over the transaction might
seem a more logical basis.4' However muddy the rule, it is clear that the
state can never compel tax collection as to all transactions unless given
federal aid.
3 8 McLeod v. Dilworth, supra note 1 (sales tax) ; General Trading Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, supra note 1 (use tax); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford,
supra note 24, and Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra note 1 (fran-
chise taxes measured by gross receipts).
39 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Joseph, supra note 23; United States Steel Corp. v. Gerosa,
7 N.Y. 2d 454, 166 N.E. 2d 489 (1960); City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil
Co., supra note 5.
40 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Cornm'n, supra note 1.
41Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, supra note 3.
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One device worth considering as a partial way out of this dilemma
is to substitute reporting by the vendor in those situations in which
collection is an unreasonable burden. This has been effective in stopping
the bootlegging of cigarettes. 42 In this instance, Congress, exercising
its power to regulate interstate commerce, has abolished the nexus re-
quirement: the vendor of cigarettes to a customer in a foreign state
must report his sales to the foreign state's tobacco tax administrator,
even though the vendor could not possibly be constitutionally subject
to that state's jurisdiction. Why could this not be extended to sales of
all goods and to all gross receipts taxes? All transactions could be
reached with ease, and the knowledge that there were such reports
would greatly increase "voluntary" compliance with use tax reporting
requirements. The burden on the vendor would be minimal, since it
would be unnecessary to know what is taxable and what is not, and
there would be no occasion for dispute with customers.
Another approach to resolving the conflict of interest between tax
administrator and involuntary tax collector is the development of a
scale of adequate compensation for collection or reporting. If the com-
pensation is truly adequate, reluctance of vendors to collect or to report
would be very greatly reduced. If to make it adequate were to make it
expensive, the inclination of tax administrators to get someone else
to do their work for them would be greatly reduced.
The difficulty lies in developing an appropriate scale. The few
statutes which now contain compensation provisions are all keyed to
percentages of collections. This method is completely unsatisfactory.
It pays too much on large transactions and too little on small. It gives
no consideration to the substantial work involved in non-taxable tran-
sactions, nor to the extra burdens of the out-of-state vendor as com-
pared to the local vendor. Difficult as it is to do, a much more sensitive
compensation basis must be devised if the compensation principle
is going to give substantial relief. It must give effect to numerous
expense factors, including numbers of returns, numbers of items
per return, correspondence, audits, and other matters not directly
related to the amounts of tax collected.
State and local taxation of multistate business is an increasingly
serious problem to tax administrators and to tax collectors. State
action to correct the inequities and to achieve uniformity cannot be
expected. The solution seems to lie in congressional action. Con-
gress has made two small steps in that direction: the Jenkins Act,
which gives states something which they could not constitutionally
have without federal aid; and Public Law 86-272, which gives tax-
42Jenldns Act, as amended, 69 Stat. 627 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§375-78 (1958) ; Con-
sumers Mail Order Ass'n. v. McGrath, 94 F. Supp. 705, aff'd., 340 U.S. 925(1950).
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payers some protection which, probably, the Constitution does not
give them. Congress apparently has the power under the interstate
commerce clause, perhaps aided by the due process clause, to force
both taxpayers and tax administrators into a reasonable accommo-
dation of each other's problems. There is no income tax nexus
problem if apportionment is sound, and Congress can remove nexus
as a problem in other cases. Collection of use taxes is a serious
problem to which there is no perfect answer, but the proper com-
bination of full use of reporting and an adequate and appropriate
scale of compensation can so far resolve the inherent conflict of
interest as to reduce it to unimportance.
It is too early to discern just what, but it is apparent that
something is developing in the area of federal regulation of state
taxation. The Special Subcommittee established as a result of Pub-
lic Law 86-272 has been most industrious. Its hearings on net-in-
come-based and sales-and-use taxes of manufacturing and merchan-
dising businesses have developed transcripts of over 850 thousand
words. Over 30,000 short questionnaires and over 5,000 long ones
were sent to taxpayers. One hundred taxpayers participated in a
detailed cost study. A questionnaire was sent to the tax administra-
tor of each state. There were also extensive studies of revenue
statistics, tax laws, and general tax literature.
The interim report released June 15, 1964, is in two closely
printed volumes. Volume I contains 599 pages of text, and in vol-
ume II there are 509 pages of appendices. Together, they are a tre-
mendous accomplishment and by far the most thorough study ever
made of net-income-based taxes. It is required reading for anyone
concerned with reform in this field. It finds that there is endless
profusion and confusion in laws, regulations, and practices apply-
ing these taxes, one result of which is unnecessary hardship on tax-
payers and another a very low level of compliance and enforcement.
The Special Subcommittee promises a second report in a few
months, covering sales and use taxes. In the meantime, its con-
clusion as to net-income-based taxes is:
Certainly, the problems presented are not easy problems, but
they are important problems. They are important to the
States and they are important to the vitality of the American
common market. Congress has a responsibility to both, and
it is time for it to seek a solution.43
43 Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, supra note 33.
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